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The barriers that impede the acquisition of materials 
which could be used to manufacture a weapon of 
mass destruction or weapon of mass effect can 
generally be classified into two groups (e.g. as 
done by the Generation IV International Forum 
[1]). The first group are classed as intrinsic barriers, 
which are characteristics that impede the diversion 
or undeclared production of nuclear material or 
misuse of technology by the Host State to acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
The second group are classed as extrinsic barriers, 
which are characteristics that impede the theft of 
materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation 
dispersal devices and the sabotage of facilities and 
transportation by sub-national entities and other 
non-Host State adversaries. Proliferation resistance 
assessments generally focus towards the intrinsic 
barriers, with physical protection assessment catering 
toward appraising the extrinsic barriers.
The intrinsic barriers can be subdivided into material 
barriers and technological barriers [2]. Material 
barriers cover the qualities of materials that reduce 
the inherent desirability or attractiveness of the 
material as an explosive. Technological barriers 
cover intrinsic technical elements of the fuel cycle, 
its facilities, processes, and equipment that serve to 
make it difficult to gain access to materials and/or 
to use or misuse facilities to obtain weapons-usable 
material.
Technical assessments can be used to appraise the 
proliferation resistance of technologies operating 
with different nuclear fuel cycles. For appraising 
material barriers, the existing Figure of Merit 
methodology by Bathke et al. [3] provides a single 
score derived from four parameters: the mass, decay 
heat, neutron emission rate, and radiotoxicity of the 
material. This methodology is particularly insightful 
in civil nuclear fuel cycles for appraising how the 
material evolves whilst it is being irradiated. For 
appraising technical barriers, different methodologies 
have been developed, which include multi-attribute 
utility analysis [4] and the use of fuzzy logic [5]. These 
methodologies factor for the infrastructure relating 
to civil nuclear fuel cycles, safeguards and timing and 
for weightings to be elicited from expert panels. 
Although the factors contributing towards technically 
appraising the proliferation resistance of technologies 
and nuclear fuel cycles are well defined, there are 
a number of open questions which can impact the 
results of such assessments, especially in novel nuclear 
fuel cycles operating in technologies of the future. 
One question surrounds the potential weaponisation 
of uranium-233. Traditionally, weapons-grade 
plutonium, containing more than 94% plutonium-239, 
and weapons-grade uranium, containing more than 
93% uranium-235, have most frequently been used 
in nuclear weapons programmes. However, another 
fissile isotope that has been previously used in nuclear 
weapons tests is uranium-233 (namely “Shot MET” in 
Operation Teapot in the US [6] and JOE-19/RDS-37 in 
the Soviet Union [7], both tests taking place in 1955). 
Uranium is generally considered more straight-
forward to weaponise than plutonium, due to the 
limited heat source and lack of spontaneously emitted 
neutrons that can cause pre-ignition. However, it 
is often noted that the formation of the isotope 
uranium-232, from high-energy neutron-induced 
reactions on thorium-232 and uranium-233, adds to 
the proliferation resistance of thorium-based nuclear 
fuel cycles. This is mainly due to the formation of the 
highly radiotoxic daughter product thallium-208 that 
can impede access to this material. Parts-per-million 
concentrations of uranium-232 within large nuclear 
fuel assemblies can provide near self-protecting dose 
rates. However, definitions of self-protecting dose 
rates vary considerably: 1 Sv/h from IAEA [8], 5 Sv/h 
from US DOE [3], and 100 Sv/h from an Oak Ridge 
report [9]. This in turn has significant implications 
on the quantities of uranium-232 that can make a 
material self-protecting. Therefore, a set of isotopic 
vectors that defines weaponisable  uranium-233, 
with corresponding uranium-232 and uranium-234 
fractions, needs to be defined and ratified [10].
Another question surrounds the technological barriers 
from the development of new civil technologies. 
Future nuclear energy technologies, such as those 
listed by the Generation IV International Forum [1], are 
typically geared towards operating in reprocessing 
based nuclear fuel cycles. Historically, reprocessing 
has involved the aqueous PUREX process to recover 
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Currently, the 
COEX process to co-extract uranium and plutonium is 
being developed by AREVA. Future reprocessing based 
schema include advanced aqueous reprocessing 
techniques (e.g. GANEX and DIAMEX) that would 
prospectively be operated at a national scale, or novel 
pyroprocessing techniques that can be employed 
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on an individual reactor scale. For pyroprocessing 
techniques, questions surround the ability for 
individual streams of special nuclear materials to be 
separated (e.g. protactinium-233, which decays into 
uranium-233) and the potential for military use of such 
technologies if wide-scale deployment is required.
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